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An appropriated state?  
Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernisation
Kamil Całus
There have been several significant changes on Moldova’s domestic political scene in the wake of 
the November 2014 parliamentary elections there. Negotiations lasted nearly two months and re-
sulted in the formation of a minority coalition composed of two groupings: the Liberal-Democratic 
Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM). New coalition received unofficial support from the 
Communist Party (PCRM), which had previously been considered an opposition party. Contrary 
to their initial announcements, PDLM and PDM did not admit the Liberal Party led by Mihai Ghim-
pu to power. Moreover, they blocked the nomination for prime minister of the incumbent, Iurie 
Leancă. Leancă has been perceived by many as an honest politician and a guarantor of reforms. 
This situation resulted in the political model present in Moldova since 2009 being preserved. In 
this model the state’s institutions are subordinated to two main oligarch politicians: Vlad Filat (the 
leader of PLDM) and Vlad Plahotniuc (a billionaire who de facto controls PDM).
With control over the state in the hands of Filat and Plahotniuc questions are raised regarding 
the prospects of Moldova’s real modernisation. It will also have a negative impact on the process 
of implementation of Moldova’s Association Agreement with the EU and on other key reforms 
concerning, for example, the judiciary, the financial sector and the process of de-politicisation of 
the state’s institutions. From both leaders’ perspective, any changes to the current state of affairs 
would be tantamount to limiting their influence in politics and the economy, which would in turn 
challenge their business activities. An attempt at building of what seems to be a real pro-Europe-
an alternative for the current ruling majority is being made by former prime minister Iurie Leancă. 
Leancă himself was prevented from staying on as prime minister for several reasons. These includ-
ed his conflict with Vlad Filat and his willingness to push through reforms which would challenge 
the interests of the coalition leaders. However, it seems unlikely that Leancă’s attempts at creating 
his own strong political party could bear impact on the shape of Moldova’s political scene. 
Despite its instability, the political system which has evolved in Moldova in recent years will be 
extremely difficult to change. Filat and Plahotniuc, who are competitors both politically and 
in business, have regularly clashed and this is having a negative impact on the government’s 
stability and on the entire political scene. Still, both leaders are mainly focused on retaining 
power. This forces them to devise a modus vivendi within one ruling coalition which practically 
is tantamount to preserving the current system.
The new shape of the political scene
Shortly after the results of the parliamenta-
ry election were announced, the three main 
pro-European parties (PLDM, PDM and the Lib-
eral Party – PL) , declared they were willing to 
revive the government coalition they have in 
recent years formed, known as the Alliance for 
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European Integration (AIE). However, despite 
two months of negotiations the parties’ leaders 
turned out to be unable to reach an agreement. 
One cause of this was the strong resistance by 
the democrats, who were unwilling to consent 
to the liberals’ demands concerning a de-politi-
cisation of the general prosecutor’s office (con-
trolled by PDM) and to the appointment of 
an official from an EU state to supervise it. As 
a consequence of this, on 23 January 2015 a mi-
nority coalition was formed, composed only of 
PLDM and PDM. It was named the Political Al-
liance for a European Moldova (APME). On the 
same day, support from the Communist Party 
(PCRM) helped the coalition to appoint Andrian 
Candu as speaker of the parliament. Candu is 
a politician who has business and family ties to 
Vlad Plahotniuc (he is Plahotniuc’s godson), the 
sponsor and real leader of PDM.
Upon request by PLDM’s leader Vlad Filat, on 
28 January 2015 President Nicolae Timofti en-
trusted Iurie Leancă, the outgoing prime min-
ister, with the task of forming the government. 
Although the candidature received support 
from the democrats, on 12 February parliament 
rejected the vote of confidence in the new 
government by votes cast by the Communists 
and the liberals. Soon after, on 18 February, 
the Moldovan parliament appointed the new 
government by votes cast by APME and the 
Communists. Chiril Gaburici, a businessman 
unfamiliar to most Moldovans, who has no po-
litical background and no political experience, 
was appointed head of the new government. 
Gaburici has ties to both former prime minis-
ter Vlad Filat and Oleg Voronin, son of Vladimir 
Voronin – PCRM’s leader and former president. 
In line with his initial announcements1, Filat put 
forward Leancă’s candidature for the office of 
prime minister. However, from the very begin-
ning neither Filat himself nor PDM were inter-
ested in Leancă continuing in this role. Leancă’s 
1 http://pldm.md/stiri /8490-iurie-leanca-candidatul-
pldm-la-functia-de-premier-al-rm
nomination to the office of the head of govern-
ment and its subsequent rejection by parliament 
seems to have been a political game aimed at 
eliminating a politician who might be a problem 
for the coalition partners. Simultaneously, this 
was a method of saving face in front of the EU. 
The EU openly expressed its support for Leancă 
and expected him to continue as prime minister.
Leancă’s public support rose gradually from 
the day he took office as prime minister in May 
2014. This was reflected in opinion polls indicat-
ing the level of trust for Moldovan politicians2. 
Leancă has also been popular with the EU, 
which perceived him as a guarantor of reforms. 
Unlike Filat, he is viewed as an honest politician 
who has not been involved in major corruption 
scandals. As a consequence, Filat (who has not 
held any public post since his dismissal as prime 
minister in March 2013, except for the function 
of PLDM’s leader) began to fear Leancă’s grow-
ing influence within the grouping. This is con-
firmed by the fact that Filat strongly opposed 
the plans to use Leancă’s image in PLDM’s elec-
toral campaign3. Moreover, Filat was interest-
ed in ousting the former prime minister from 
office because of the latter’s support for inclu-
2 When he took office in May 2013, Leancă enjoyed support 
of just less than 0.4% of voters, however, at the time of the 
elections in November 2014 he was ranked second after 
Filat and his approval ratings were twice as high as Filat’s. 
Cf. http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_apri-
lie_2013_Final.pdf and http://www.ipp.md/public/files/
Barometru/Brosura_BOP_11.2014_prima_parte-r.pdf
3 At the same time, using Filat’s image in the campaign 
was not a good idea due to the negative associations 
evoked by former prime minister’s involvement in cor-
ruption scandals. Finally, PLDM’s campaign was based 
mainly on slogans and party symbols.
Leancă’s nomination to the office of the 
head of government and its subsequent 
rejection by parliament seems to have 
been a political game aimed at eliminat-
ing a politician who might be a problem 
for the coalition partners.
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sion of European and American experts in an 
investigation of the situation on the Moldovan 
financial market. It is likely that such an investi-
gation could reveal Filat’s involvement in illegal 
transfers of money from the Moldovan financial 
sector (more on this below). 
It was not in the interest of the Democratic Par-
ty for Leancă to stay on as prime minister, main-
ly due to the fact that he used to consistently 
block attempts to privatise state enterprises 
(e.g. Moldtelecom) which could favour PDM’s 
leaders. Leancă also targeted PDM’s interests 
and insisted on a de-politicisation of the gen-
eral prosecutor’s office and on a thorough re-
form of the judiciary. Similarly, the Communists 
considered Leancă’s candidature unfit, and al-
though they did not formally join the coalition, 
they were instrumental to PLDM and PDM in 
forming the new government. Fearing for its 
image, PCRM did not want to support Prime 
Minister Leancă and in the period of approxi-
mately 18 months since he took office, PCRM 
repeatedly demanded that he step down. Sec-
ondly, Vladimir Voronin, aware of the fact that 
without votes cast by the Communists the co-
alition would not be able to form a new gov-
ernment, tried to push through the candidature 
of his protégé Chiril Gaburici, and not Leancă, 
who was openly hostile to him. 
Both the final shape of the new, Commu-
nist-backed minority coalition currently in pow-
er in Moldova, and also the way in which it was 
formed, indicate that a real modernisation of 
Moldova and a structural reform of the still 
post-Soviet-style state institutions is not in the 
interest of key actors on the Moldovan politi-
cal scene. On the contrary, their only aim is to 
maintain full control of the state. This control 
is necessary to secure the political and busi-
ness interests of the leaders of these groups: 
Vlad Filat and Vlad Plahotniuc, both of whom 
are prominent actors in the Moldovan econo-
my. For this reason, both PLDM and PDM at-
tempted to remove Iurie Leancă from power. 
Leancă stems from diplomatic circles, not busi-
ness circles, and his growing independence and 
popularity, combined with his simultaneous 
inclination for radical reforms, posed a threat 
to Filat’s and Plahotniuc’s business endeavours. 
This is also why the two parties opposed the 
participation of the liberals in the ruling coa-
lition. They (the liberals) supported the plans 
to carry out thorough reforms which would de 
facto limit the influence of Plahotniuc and Filat.
A Moldovan-style oligarchy
A process of subordinating state institutions 
to the leaders of the parties making up the 
government coalition began in Moldova upon 
the Alliance for European Integration assum-
ing power in 20094. In line with an undisclosed 
protocol which made up a part of the coalition 
agreement of 8 August 2009, a ‘party formula’ 
was established to be used when nominating 
candidates to major public offices. This formula 
covered not only the office of the prime minis-
ter, the speaker of the parliament and individu-
al ministers, but also those posts which should 
never be staffed by party-nominated candi-
dates. These include the posts of general pros-
ecutor, the head of the central tax office, the 
governor of the National Bank of Moldova and 
the head of the Central Electoral Committee. 
A strict division of the areas of influence within 
4 This does not mean that state institutions were not 
previously used as a tool by political parties in power 
at that time. In 2001 the Party of Communists led by 
Vladimir Voronin, having an absolute parliamentary ma-
jority, subordinated all state institutions. Both Voronin 
and people closely associated with him, in particular his 
son, businessman Oleg Voronin, used control over state 
institutions to obtain measurable business profits. 
Both Filat and Plahotniuc are billionaires, 
for whom control over key state institu-
tions is mainly a method of securing their 
business dealings.
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state institutions serves the interest of the lead-
ers of the two major coalition parties – Vlad Filat, 
the leader of PLDM, and Vlad Plahotniuc. Both 
Filat and Plahotniuc are billionaires5 who de-
veloped their fortunes back in the 1990s, often 
in dubious circumstances. From their perspec-
tive, control over key state institutions is mainly 
a method of securing their business dealings 
and of creating the best possible development 
conditions for their enterprises. On the other 
hand, this control brings them financial bene-
fits, made possible due to their influence over 
state-owned companies (banks in particular), 
due to their participation in public tenders and 
privatisation processes, and to their access to 
loans and subsidies granted by foreign entities6. 
Furthermore, they have also used their control 
over state institutions to maintain their position 
in power circles. This was clearly visible in the 
course of parliamentary elections organised in 
November 2014. By exerting influence on the 
Central Electoral Committee and the judiciary, 
the ruling parties managed for example to elim-
inate one of the main political competitors, the 
Patria party led by Renato Usati, from the elec-
toral race just three days prior to polling day7.
One example of how control of state insti-
tutions can be a source of significant finan-
cial profits for the leaders of PLDM and PDM 
is seen in the illegal transfer of over 1 billion 
euros from three Moldovan banks: Banca de 
5 According to a ranking list prepared by Forbes for 2014, 
Vlad Plahotniuc is the second richest person in Moldova 
and his wealth is estimated at over US$ 2 billion. Vlad 
Filat has been ranked third with assets worth approx-
imately US$ 1.2 billion; http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-
esential-7606255-presa-rusa-premierul-vlad-filat-locul-
trei-topul-celor-mai-bogati-oameni-din-moldova.htm
6 One example is the 100 million euro loan offered by the 
Polish government in March 2014 for agricultural devel-
opment support. Poland is ready to make the funds avail-
able at any time. However, acceptance of the loan is being 
blocked by a conflict between Moldovan institutions which 
would be responsible for collecting loan applications and 
compiling lists of borrowers. From the point of view of 
Moldovan state offices, and also of political leaders, the 
possibility to influence the selection of beneficiaries can be 
another source of considerable profits. 
7 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-12-03/
moldova-moderate-success-pro-european-parties
Economii, Banca Sociala and Unibank. Recent-
ly, these banks granted multi-million loans to 
companies associated with Ilan Shor (a Mol-
dovan-Russian businessman), Vlad Filat, and 
probably also Vlad Plahotniuc. A large portion 
of these loans was considered ‘unpayable’ from 
the very beginning. As a consequence, since it 
was impossible to collect the debt, the banks 
involved in this illegal practice began to rapidly 
lose financial liquidity. To rescue them, in No-
vember and December 2014 the National Bank 
of Moldova (NBM) introduced state supervision 
of the three banks and decided to launch bail-
out programmes amounting to hundreds of 
millions of euros shifted across from currency 
reserves. This practice would have not been 
possible without the involvement of the coali-
tion leaders. The NBM, whose task is to super-
vise financial transfers in the country’s banking 
sector, must have been aware of the operations 
of dubious profitability being carried out by 
these three banks. The reason behind the lack 
of action to stop this practice and maintain fi-
nancial liquidity was most probably political. It 
seems to have been a result of political pressure 
exerted by Filat and maybe also by Plahotniuc8.
Practices present in Moldovan politics in recent 
years indicate that a process of appropriating 
the state by interest groups centred around 
the two main political leaders is under way. 
This represents a typically post-Soviet model of 
oligarchy in which the country’s most power-
ful figures try not so much to interfere in the 
8 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/delo-na-milliardy-10334
Despite the fact that the most prominent 
public posts are held by other individuals, 
in practice it is Vlad Filat and Vlad Plahot-
niuc who make the key political decisions, 
often by directly instructing specific minis-
ters or heads of state institutions.
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state’s politics by exerting economic pressure, 
but are rather focused on exercising immediate 
power to secure their business dealings. If, for 
some reason, they do not want or cannot hold 
major public posts themselves, they nominate 
to individuals these posts who have no political 
background and are dependent on their sup-
port. An example of this involved the changes 
in the office of prime minister and the speaker 
of parliament in May 2013, as well as after re-
cent parliamentary elections9. Despite the fact 
that the most prominent public posts are held 
by other individuals, in practice it is Vlad Filat 
and Vlad Plahotniuc who make the key politi-
cal decisions, often by directly instructing spe-
cific ministers or heads of state institutions10.
This type of oligarchic system is very unstable; 
this was evident during the final five years of 
the pro-European coalition’s rule. This instabili-
ty is based on a paradox. On the one hand, the 
two main coalition leaders, Filat and Plahotni-
uc, are one another’s business and political ri-
vals involved in a permanent contest to expand 
their influence within the current system and to 
9 As a result of the political crisis which lasted from Janu-
ary until May 2013, Filat’s government was overthrown. 
At the same time, pursuant to a ruling by the Constitu-
tional Court Filat was prohibited from running for the 
office of prime minister again. As a consequence, using 
the support of PDM, Filat requested the president to 
nominate the then foreign minister Iurie Leancă to this 
office. Leancă was considered fully subordinated to for-
mer prime minister and lacking a political background. 
10 This was mentioned by Iurie Leancă on 12 March 2015; 
http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/ lyanke-otritsaet-
svoyu-prichastnost-k-vyvodu-iz-strany-1-mlrd-10010
diminish that of their rival11. On the other hand, 
though, they are interested in maintaining 
power and preserving the current system. This 
has forced them to devise a certain modus vi-
vendi to be able to function within one govern-
ment coalition. Moreover, they do not intend 
to admit other parties and anti-government 
politicians to power, since these could make at-
tempts to change the current oligarchic system. 
For this reason, both Filat and Plahotniuc pre-
ferred to build an informal coalition with the 
Communists (who are interested in preserving 
the system in order to be present in it) rather 
than invite liberals or Leancă to power. 
A new political party: 
a challenge to the coalition?
In the immediate future, a new political party is 
likely to appear on the Moldovan political scene. 
It will be established by former prime minister 
Iurie Leancă. According to his announcements, 
this is going to be a pro-European project in-
tended to be an electoral alternative for PLDM 
and PDM. The new party will most likely be 
called the Moldovan Popular European Party12. 
Several politicians supporting Leancă have al-
ready expressed their intention to take part in 
the project. They include Eugen Carpov (former 
deputy prime minister for reintegration, who 
left the party alongside Leancă), Victor Luten-
co (former head of the office for relations with 
11 The most striking example of the destabilisation of the 
domestic political situation as a result of the fight for in-
fluence between Filat and Plahotniuc has been the scan-
dal involving a hunting trip in the Padurea Domneasca 
nature reserve. During this trip, the head of the general 
prosecutor’s office controlled by the democrats reported-
ly shot Moldovan businessman Sorin Paciu by accident. 
Filat tried to use this scandal to discredit Plahotniuc and 
to gain control of the prosecutor’s office. The political 
fight, which lasted for almost six months, brought about 
a fall of government. It was only due to an intervention 
by the EU that the possibility of early parliamentary elec-
tions was averted. It is almost certain that these elections 
would have been won by the Communists.
12 http://unimedia.info/stiri/leanca-dezvaluie-detalii-de-
spre-viitorul-sau-partid--cum-se-va-numi-si-ce-culoare-
va-avea-90510.html
A new political party is likely to appear on the 
Moldovan political scene. It will be estab-
lished by former prime minister Iurie Leancă. 
According to his announcements, this is go-
ing to be a pro-European project intended to 
be an alternative for PLDM and PDM.
6OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 168
Moldovans living abroad) and Valeriu Chiver 
and Iulian Groza (former deputy foreign minis-
ters). The new project can also probably count 
on support from the civic initiative Dignity and 
Truth. It was created on 24 February 2015 by 
prominent Moldovan civil rights activists, ana-
lysts and columnists. This initiative has been cre-
ated in protest against the actions carried out 
by the current authorities which caused a “total 
subordination of state institutions to the inter-
ests of political clans” and an “unprecedented 
threat to the financial and banking sector”13. 
The future of the new party created by the for-
mer prime minister is very unclear, though. De-
spite the fact that of all politicians Leancă enjoys 
the highest level of support within Moldovan so-
ciety (a 9.6% advantage of trust over distrust)14, 
he is more of a diplomat and a bureaucrat than 
a charismatic political leader able to build a strong 
party. This is one of the reasons why the current 
level of support for Leancă’s political project is 
approximately only 6,2%15. The new party’s 
source of funding has also been called into ques-
tion. Without funding, the party will not be able 
to compete with PLDM and PDM sponsored by 
13 These expressions were used by one of the founders 
of the initiative, a prominent Moldovan analyst and 
politician Oazu Nantoi, who expressed his support for 
Leancă’s project; http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/
pod-moldavskoy-vlastyu-zashatalas-platforma-9284
14 In the context of the extremely low level of confidence in 
politicians typical of Moldovan society, Leancă’s support 
figures should be considered very high. For comparison: 
Vlad Filat is trusted by just 3.3% of the population sur-
veyed, and prime minister Gaburici – by a mere 1.2% 
of respondents; http://inprofunzime.md/stiri/politic/
iurie-leanca-se-bucura-in-continuare-de-cea-mai-mare-
incredere---903901.html
15 h t t p : / / w w w. i p p . m d / p u b l i c / f i l e s / B a r o m e t r u /
BOP_04.2015_prima_parte_finale.pdf
Filat and Plahotniuc. Leancă has announced that 
the funds to cover the party’s activities will mainly 
be raised from its supporters in the form of volun-
tary donations; this, however, will not be enough. 
It is not inconceivable that Leancă will receive fi-
nancial support from Moldova’s former prime 
minister and billionaire Ion Sturza. However, ac-
cording to what Leancă said, Sturza is not going 
to be a member of the party. Another serious 
problem for the prospective party led by Leancă 
might be restricted access to mainstream media, 
which is largely controlled by Vlad Plahotniuc or 
individuals associated with PLDM16. It should be 
expected that PLDM and PDM will be making at-
tempts to discredit Leancă in the eyes of society. 
The first such attempt was a statement by Vlad 
Filat made on 12 March 2015, in which he point-
ed out that it was Leancă who signed the lease 
agreement pertaining to Chișinău airport, which 
has remained unclear and unfavourable for the 
Moldovan state17. Similarly, he pointed to Leancă 
as the person bearing political responsibility for 
the condition of Banca de Economii (Leancă was 
prime minister at that time). It is likely that PLDM 
and PDM will try to use their influence in the state 
administration to hamstring the process of reg-
istration of the party or any activity intended to 
promote Leancă’s initiative.
Five years of ‘Euro-imitation’
From the perspective of the parties currently in 
power in Moldova, European integration is in-
teresting as an idea which makes it possible to 
attract the pro-European electorate. It is also 
considered a source of aid funds and loans. 
However, the real dimension of European inte-
gration, involving modernising the country by 
way of implementing necessary reforms, is not 
16 Chiril Lucinschi is a media tycoon representing the interests 
of PLDM. He is a member of this party and son of Moldo-
va’s former president Petru Lucinschi (1996–2001).
17 On 4 September 2013, the airport in Chișinău, the only 
international airport operating in Moldova, was leased 
to the Russian company Avia-Invest for 49 years; http://
resurs.md/economie/2639-aeroport-kontsessia
From the perspective of the parties cur-
rently in power in Moldova, European in-
tegration understood as modernising the 
country by way of implementing neces-
sary reforms, is not favourable.
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favourable for the coalition leaders because it 
poses a threat to their business dealings. This 
is why, despite five years of rule by a coalition 
composed of pro-European parties which from 
the beginning announced their intention to 
modernise Moldova in the Western style, the 
country has not been subject to any structur-
al reconstruction concerning how the state in-
stitutions operate. Huge aid funds worth hun-
dreds of millions of euros18 granted by the EU 
as part of support for reform programmes did 
not help much. For example, attempts at limit-
ing the scale of ever-present, endemic corrup-
tion permeating all spheres of life in Moldova 
– from the judiciary through the financial sector 
to the schooling system and healthcare – have 
proved unsuccessful. During the coalition’s rule, 
the scale of corruption increased further, which 
is evidenced by a drop of Moldova’s position in 
the Corruption Perceptions Index ranking list 
run by Transparency International – from 89th 
position in 2009 to 103rd in 201419. Only 7% of 
Moldovans assess the effectiveness of the state’s 
anti-corruption actions as positive20. During the 
rule of the pro-European parties, the Nation-
al Anti-Corruption Centre, in place since 2002, 
which was supposed to be de-politicised and re-
formed to a degree even larger than during the 
rule of the Communists, was used mainly as an 
instrument of wielding political power.
The reorganisation of the Moldovan judiciary 
has not been successful, either. Appropriate 
legislation required by the EU concerning the 
reform of the judiciary was adopted, but was 
never implemented. This is why this area has 
remained corruption-ridden, ineffective and 
deeply subordinated to political influence. As 
18 During just three years (from 2010 until 2013) Moldova 
received 550 million euros from the EU, apart from funds 
made available under the “More for more” programme; 
http://www.vedomosti.md/news/Za_Tri_Goda_Moldo-
va_Poluchila_Ot_Es_550_Millionov_Evro_
19 Cf. http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009/0/ 
and http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
20 After the Opiniei Publice poll conducted in November 
2014 by Institutul de Politici Publice; http://www.ipp.
md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=718
a result of the dearth of real changes, since 
2009 the level of society’s confidence in the 
judiciary has fallen from 37% to 23%21. The 
weakness of the Moldovan judiciary and its de-
pendence on political factors is clearly visible 
for example in the fact that the circumstanc-
es of the events of 7 April 2009 are still to be 
explained and the perpetrators have not been 
sentenced. The events in question involved the 
Moldovan police and security service detain-
ing, interrogating and illegally torturing doz-
ens of demonstrators who took part in anti- 
-Communist rallies in the centre of Chișinău22.
Similarly, no administrative reform to de-cen-
tralise the state has been implemented. Initial 
changes in this respect were officially launched 
in January 2012 as part of the implementation 
of the “national decentralisation strategy”. The 
political parties which are currently in power 
are not really interested in transferring a por-
tion of central competencies to the regions (this 
concerns budgetary issues in particular), as this 
would reduce the opportunities to use local 
administration officials, currently controlled by 
the ruling parties, for example to carry out elec-
toral canvassing. 
Another extremely important problem is the 
non-transparency and the instability of the Mol-
dovan financial sector which requires thorough 
21 Ibid. 
22 On 19 January 2015 the Appellate Court ian Chișinău 
sentenced Gheorghe Papuc, the then interior minister, to 
four years in prison in connection with these events. Af-
ter the sentence was pronounced, Papuc managed to flee 
Moldova. This further illustrates the scale of corruption in 
the Moldovan judiciary.
The coalition’s attempts at limiting the 
scale of ever-present, endemic corruption 
permeating all spheres of life in Moldova 
– from the judiciary through the financial 
sector to the schooling system and health-
care – have proved unsuccessful.
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reform. Despite the fact that legislation forc-
ing the banks to disclose information on their 
shareholders was adopted in 2014, the owner-
ship structure of major Moldovan banks has re-
mained unclear. Shares in these banks have been 
subject to regular re-selling, often as a result of 
so-called ‘corporate raiding’, which mainly in-
volves the illegal acquisition of shares via cor-
rupt court rulings or as a result of extortion. In 
these circumstances, the lack of real control of 
the state over the financial sector made it pos-
sible for approximately 1 billion euros from the 
Moldovan banking system to be transferred via 
three large Moldovan banks in 2014. Due to this 
lack of control  Moldovan banks have been also 
used for money laundering carried out main-
ly by Moldovan and Russian businesspeople23.
The few successful attempts at implementing 
reforms made by Moldova’s pro-European gov-
ernment mostly concern the implementation of 
regulations related to Chișinău’s efforts to in-
clude Moldova into the deep and comprehensive 
free trade area (DCFTA) and to cover Moldova’s 
citizens with the right to visa-free entry to the 
Schengen zone. The success of these reforms 
was confirmed in April 2014 when visa require-
ments pertaining to Moldova’s citizens travelling 
to Schengen states were abolished. The Associ-
ation Agreement between Moldova and the EU 
was signed in June 2014 (along with the DCFTA 
agreement which makes up one part of it). The 
investment climate in Moldova has also some-
what improved; however, investors continue to 
23 https://reportingproject.net/the-russian-laundromat/
russian-laundromat.php
complain about the problems they encounter 
when dealing with Moldova’s tax authorities, 
customs service and prosecutor’s office24.
Prospects
The system of power which emerged in Mol-
dova, dominated by two oligarchs who control 
the two major political parties, is extremely dif-
ficult to change. This is because the integration 
of the state’s institutions with business circles is 
very deep and has no precedent in the history 
of Moldova after 1991. The potential loss of po-
litical influence by representatives of the ruling 
elite would spell a very serious weakening of their 
business position. This was evident for example 
in the case of Oleg Voronin, son of PCRM’s lead-
er, who lost a major part of his income after the 
Communists withdrew from power in 2009. To 
some degree, the economic position of Moldovan 
oligarchs has been a result of their control over 
lucrative private businesses and the simultaneous 
creation of favourable conditions for their oper-
ation by exerting influence on the government. 
However, what is fundamental to the exalted po-
sition of a portion of the Moldovan political and 
business elite is the oligarchs’ participation in the 
system of power and their access to the state’s 
financial transfers (including foreign aid) which 
results from it. It also enables this group to reap 
considerable profit from corrupt practices. 
In this type of system, there is serious doubt as 
to whether Moldova can maintain a long-term 
pro-European orientation. It should be expected 
that if PLDM and PDM, supported by the Commu-
nists, continue to block the implementation of re-
forms they might perceive as a challenge to their 
interests, including the reform required by the As-
sociation Agreement (and this seems probable), 
Brussels will radically cut the financial aid grant-
ed to Moldova and will reduce political support 
24 The successes and failures of the Moldovan reform 
programme are discussed in a report by the European 
Commission available online at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-15-4682_en.htm
The system of power which emerged in 
Moldova, dominated by two oligarchs who 
control the two major political parties, is ex-
tremely difficult to change. It has no prec-
edent in the history of Moldova after 1991.
9OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 168
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Wojciech Konończuk  
Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska 
TRANSLATION: Magdalena Klimowicz   
CO-OPERATION: Nicholas Furnival
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
it currently gives to Moldova’s coalition leaders25. 
It cannot be ruled out that when the benefits re-
sulting from the promotion of the idea of Euro-
pean integration are over, the coalition parties 
will have to look for an alternative which would 
help them maintain power. This seems proba-
ble especially for the Democratic Party, whose 
supporters are not as clearly pro-Western as 
the supporters of the Liberal-Democratic Party. 
It is possible that they would welcome a change 
of the government’s political orientation to 
a pro-Russian one. It seems that Vlad Plahot-
niuc might have already taken the first steps 
to assure good cooperation with Russia for 
himself should this eventuality come to pass26.
It is beyond doubt that the functioning of the 
25 Until the end of 2014, the EU’s support for the Moldovan gov-
ernment was largely unconditional. Even the 2013 corruption 
scandal and other less serious cases of the abuse of power 
did not limit the scale of financial support offered by Brussels 
to Chișinău, nor did they influence the frequency of visits by 
EU officials to Moldova. However, the situation has changed 
after the recent parliamentary elections. Pirkka Tapiola, head 
of the EU’s Delegation to Moldova, said on 30 March 2015 
that the EU’s financing of reforms in Moldova will depend on 
the results of these reforms and that due to ineffective imple-
mentation of reforms of the judiciary the second instalment 
of EU funds earmarked for that purpose was paid out and it 
became ‘irreversibly lost’; http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/
es-prizval-moldovu-igrat-po-pravilam-10787
26 On 15 March 2015 an unexpected meeting between Kyrgyz-
stan’s President Almazbek Atambayev and Plahotniuc took 
place in Chișinău. According to press reports, Atambayev was 
on his way from Bishkek to St. Petersburg to meet President 
Vladimir Putin. During his stopover visit to Chișinău, he re-
portedly received from Plahotniuc a package of cooperation 
proposals addressed to President Putin. Possible cooperation 
between Moldova and Russia would include a resolution of 
the Transnistria problem; http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/
vladimir-plahotnyuk-ishchet-vyhod-na-kreml-10547
system of oligarchy which emerged in Moldo-
va in recent years suits Russia. Firstly, it slows 
down the process of Moldova’s integration 
with the EU (or even blocks it completely in the 
long-term perspective). Furthermore, it makes 
it possible for the Kremlin to influence Moldo-
va’s politics by corrupting business clans by way 
of economic and political arguments. Moldo-
va’s political elite is not really interested in the 
country’s deep reconstruction and comprehen-
sive integration with European structures. This 
leads to a situation in which Russia does not 
need to take any radical measures to stop the 
process of Moldova’s de-Sovietisation and the 
implementation of a European model of state 
and of the economy in Moldova.
